BF2S Forums How Does The Fight in Afghanistan Look?

AMONG the army huts clustered on the bleak, windswept outskirts of Kabul is the Counterinsurgency Training Centre, Afghanistan. It is where 50-year-old US special forces colonel John F. Agoglia devises strategy and tactics to deal with a worsening Taliban crisis that by some estimates has put about half of the country at risk of insurgent attack.

"We've done some stupid shit. We focused on terrorism, not governance, and probably realised that about three years ago," the blunt Brooklyn-born officer says.

Depending on who you speak to, the conflict in Afghanistan is an equilateral triangle where war fighting is just one facet of counter-insurgency that is equally dependent on economic development and governance to achieve desired outcomes.

Some command purists - especially the British - dispute triangular theory. They say the correct shape is a pentagon because two other variables - narcotics and Pakistan - also need to be considered.

The final shape emerging last week around the International Security Assistance Force headquarters was a hexagon following general agreement on the use of a new buzzword, partnering.

By its nature counter-insurgency warfare tends to be protracted - the average conflict lasts about 15 years. Victory or defeat has usually been determined by the time eight years have elapsed , which is how long the war in Afghanistan has been running.

"Right now we're on the cusp but it is starting to shift. We can pull this off, but it will require a massive shift in how we think," says Texan academic Terry Tucker, a veteran counter-insurgency expert and former US army officer.
His colleague Agoglia says ISAF wasted years mistakenly believing Afghanistan was a strictly counter-terrorism mission.
Agoglia believes much can be achieved within 18 months.

Not all Taliban insurgents are diehard fanatics; the surge will separate the moderates who can be won over with the right support, he says. Those who continue to resist will be hunted down and killed, Agoglia insists.

The recent alarming increase in support for the insurgents owes much to the inability of the Karzai government to deliver economic development and justice to vulnerable regions including two key southern provinces, Kandahar and Helmand, unsurprisingly both centres of a thriving multi-million-dollar opium industry.